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Abstract
The article reviews the main constitutional arguments for the
protection of lobbying brought about in the United States and in the
European Union, putting such arguments in a legal history context.
After explaining the relevance and topicality of the study of lobbying
from a constitutional law perspective (Part 1), attention is paid to
the issue of properly defining lobbying (Part 2). The article then
outlines the key features of the law of lobbying in the two legal
systems considered (Part 3), and then links this analysis with some
broader reflections on free speech and democracy in the two areas
considered, in order to show how different is the way in which
the two areas conceptualize a constitutional `right to lobby' (Part 4).
The final paragraph offers some concluding remarks, making a few
policy recommendations (Part 5).
1 Lobbying and constitutional law
In recent years, both in the United States and in the European Union, lobbying
has been the subject of much attention in the public debate, mostly triggered
by scandals that have involved high-ranking officials and prominent lobbyists.1
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Consequently, many of the views expressed about lobbying, from both sides
of the ideological spectrum, are critical of this practice, and of the influence
that organised interests are able to exert on the democratic political process
this way.2 Some people would suggest that lobbying is not much more than
a form of legalised corruption: US President Obama himself has repeatedly
echoed this line of thought, during his campaign for the presidency and once
in office.3 However, many lobbyists and civil libertarians reject these charges,
arguing that lobbying is a form of political expression; therefore, it cannot be
restricted without infringing both certain crucial tenets of democracy and certain
fundamental individual rights, chiefly what in theUS are called `First Amendment
freedoms', in particular freedom of speech, freedom of association, and freedom
to petition the government.4
Freedom of expression and democracy are the two opposing poles that frame
the debate over lobbying. It is, therefore, to a great extent a constitutional debate:
both sides rely heavily on constitutional principles to argue that lobbying must or
must not be restricted. Without taking sides in this debate, this article contrasts
how such arguments were developed in the legal systems of the US and the EU,
and how they are reflected in the respective rules on lobbying.5 A relatively
(2009), 3-24) and the `cash-for-laws' scandal in the EU Parliament, exposed by the Sunday
Times with a series of articles in March 2011 (see e.g. `Euro MPs exposed in ``cash-for-laws''
scandal' Sunday Times, 20March 2011, <http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/news/insight/art
icle582604.ece> [accessed 25 July 2013]).
2
A classic critique of the power of interest group is the one by T J Lowi, The End of Liberalism:
The Second Republic of the United States (2nd edn, 1979). See also B Judis, The Paradox of American
Democracy: Elites, Special Interests, and the Betrayal of Public Trust (2000).
3
Besides attacking the power of lobbyists in many interviews and speeches, he also refused to
accept contributions from lobbyists for his first presidential campaign. On his first day in of-
fice of his first term he signed an Executive Order, Ethics Commitments by Executive Branch Per-
sonnel, dictating a series of strict rules with which the administration officials have to com-
ply in their relationships with lobbyists. See also R L Hasen, `Lobbying, Rent Seeking and the
Constitution' (2012) 64 Stan LR 191, 204-207. Some challenges have been brought to some of
the new rules introduced by the Obama administration, but they have been rejected so far:
see K Bogardus, `Federal court tosses out lawsuit challenging Obama's lobbyist ban' The Hill,
26 September 2012, <http://thehill.com/business-a-lobbying/258785-judge-tosses-out-lawsuit-
against-obamas-lobbyist-ban> [accessed 25 July 2013].
4
See generally H Eastman, Lobbying: A Constitutionally Protected Right (1977); more broadly on
the debate over the existence or not of a constitutional right to lobby, see below n 25 and
accompanying text.
5
Clearly, the US and the EU are not homogeneous polities, the former being a single federal
state, while the latter being a union of still sovereign states (to be sure, the US is not a unitary
entity either: every state has its own legislation, autonomous from the federal model). However,
454 Riccardo de Caria
detailed analysis of such rules will show some unexpected results. On the one
hand, I will show that, at first sight, the two regulatory frameworks are more
similar than one might anticipate. Indeed, the restrictions to lobbying activities,
however different in the two areas under consideration, are motivated by the
same goal of transparency. On the other hand, though, such transparency goal
is brought about against the background of different legal systems and different
legal histories, which leads me to submit that beneath the surface of this apparent
similarity lies a rather significant divergence in the theoretical justifications for
the respective regulations.
While the First Amendment to the US constitution was passed in a little in-
stitutionalised environment, reflected in its `uncompromised' structure,6 current
European constitutional documents were drafted with a much heavier histori-
cal and institutional background, which led to a more qualified protection of the
freedom of expression. This might partially account for the fact that lobbying in
the US is practiced more openly and in more venues, while in Europe it remains
an activity that cannot even be called by its own name (but needs synonyms to
be referred to), and tends to be confined to the law-making forum. It is finally
submitted that, on its turn, this is connected to the nature of the legal systems
considered: it is arguably the flexible common law system that leaves more room
for lobbying at different levels, and also for idealistic, non-economic, grassroots
lobbying, whereas the more rigid civil law system leads to concentrate lobbying
efforts on legislators, and tends not to leave much room for grassroots lobby-
ing, thus affording a competitive advantage to organisations lobbying for business
reasons.
This article is structured in the following way: first, I will define exactly
what is meant by lobbying from a regulatory point of view (Part 2). After that,
I will analyse the essentials of lobbying regulation in the US and the EU; the
most relevant sources for the purposes of this article will be the Supreme Court's
case law in the US and certain non-legislative documents from EU institutions
(Part 3). After that, I will investigate the different ways in which the two areas
under consideration conceptualise a constitutional `right to lobby', and on the
the way lobbying is conducted in the District of Columbia does not differ substantially from
the practice of lobbying in Brussels; more importantly, the EU can regulate the lobbying of its
institutions with substantially the same powers as the US with respect to federal government.
Therefore, constrasting the two models seems a legitimate exercise of comparison.
6
On the history of the First Amendment, see e.g. A R Amar, The Bill of Rights: creation and
reconstruction (1998), 20-45; for an historical overview, see also C R Sunstein, Interest Groups
in American Public Law' (1985) 38 Stan LR 29.
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implications of such different approaches (Part 4). Finally, I will draw conclusions
on why, despite the asymmetry in the comparison between lobbying law in the
US and in the EU, such comparison is still a worthwhile effort (Part 5).
2 Lobbying defined
According toWebster's Dictionary, to `lobby' means `[t]o address or solicit members
of a legislative body in the lobby or elsewhere, with the purpose to influence
their votes'.7 Similarly, Black's Law Dictionary defines the verb `lobby' as: `1. To
talk with or curry favor with a legislator, usually repeatedly or frequently, in an
attempt to influence the legislator's vote. 2. To support or oppose (a measure) by
working to influence a legislator's vote. 3. To try to influence (a decision-maker)'.8
Broadly speaking, then, lobbying refers to the attempt by anyone, for any reason,
to persuade a public official to take any sort of decision on any topic (from the
enactment or rejection of a bill or any other regulation, to the funding of a certain
project, to the appointment of someone to a public office, and so on). As such,
lobbying is well known everywhere in the world, and has presumably existed
as long as politics itself, at least in its modern version typical of representative
democracies: as soon as we have people who have the power to take decisions
on behalf of a whole community, there will always be somebody interested in
persuading them to decide in one way or another.
However, what I am interested in here, and is the distinctive feature of
the legal systems that regulate lobbying—traditionally the US and now also the
EU—is only professional lobbying, i.e. the pressure exerted on public officials by
interest groups as part of their day-to-day business. Interest groups can practice
lobbying in-house, or outsource it to lobbying firms, but in both cases those who
actually perform this activity are professionals highly specialised in dealing with
public officials, and in the subject matters in which those whom they represent
are active. In this article, I am concerned with the rules and the constitutional
principles that govern the activity of these professionals, whose job it is to `lobby',
and who can be described as `stable intermediaries' between interest groups, on
the one hand, and politics, on the other. Indeed, such professionals develop a deep
knowledge of the law-making process, as well as the rules regulating the activity
of government agencies enforcing the law, and have a personal acquaintance with
7
Webster's Revised Unabridged Dictionary (1913) <http://www.encyclo.co.uk/webster2/search.php> [ac-
cessed 25 July 2013] (entry for `lobby' when used as an intransitive verb) .
8
Black's Law Dictionary (9th edn, 2009), (entry for `lobby').
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many of the people involved in these circuits. Private interests turn to lobbyists
because the lobbyists know the right people to talk to about an issue they are
concerned with, and often have some personal connection with them that they
have cultivated over time. In this sense, lobbyists intermediate between private
parties and politics, and do it stably, as their job, acting on a regular basis as a drive
belt between the polity, on the one hand, and the policy-makers, on the other (I
will come back on the notion of `stable intermediaries' in Part 4).
The principal US federal law on the subject, the Lobbying Disclosure Act 1995
(LDA), is solely concerned with professional lobbying. S 3 of the LDA does not
contain a definition of lobbying itself, but it stipulates that `lobbying activities'
are:
lobbying contacts and efforts in support of such contacts, including
preparation and planning activities, research and other background
work that is intended, at the time it is performed, for use in contacts,
and coordination with the lobbying activities of others.9
In turn, a `lobbying contact' is to be considered:
any oral or written communication [...] to a covered executive
branch official or a covered legislative branch official that ismade on
behalf of a client with regard to—(i) the formulation, modification,
or adoption of Federal legislation [...]; (ii) the formulation, modifi-
cation, or adoption of a Federal rule, regulation, Executive order, or
any other program, policy, or position of the United States Govern-
ment; (iii) the administration or execution of a Federal program or
policy […]; or (iv) the nomination or confirmation of a person for a
position subject to confirmation by the Senate.10
Finally, s 3 of the LDA also clarifies who is a `lobbyist'. A quantitative criterion is
used:
The term `lobbyist' means any individual who is employed or re-
tained by a client for financial or other compensation for services
9
Lobbying Disclosure Act 1995 (US) 2 USC § 1602.
10
Ibid, s 3. The `covered executive branch official' means the President, the Vice-President, the
members of the cabinet and their staff, while the `covered legislative branch official' means the
members of Congress, their staff and the staff of parliamentary commissions.
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that include more than one lobbying contact, other than an indi-
vidual whose lobbying activities constitute less than 20 percent of
the time engaged in the services provided by such individual to that
client over a 3-month period.11
The 20 percent threshold has been criticised as arbitrary, difficult tomeasure, and
therefore relatively easy to circumvent,12 but it is currently the relevant distinctive
criterion in the law.
As far as EU law is concerned, as we shall see the bulk of lobbying regulation
is still of a non-mandatory nature, so there are no binding documents containing
an official definition, comparable to the one of the LDA. However, a definition
of lobbying' was provided by the Green Paper entitled `European Transparency
Initiative', presented by the Commission on 3 May 2006: according to it, ```lob-
bying'' means all activities carried out with the objective of influencing the policy
formulation and decision-making processes of the European institutions.'13
The recent `Agreement between the European Parliament and the European
Commission on the establishment of a transparency register for organisations
and self-employed individuals engaged in EU policy-making and policy imple-
mentation' (Transparency Register Agreement), includes an analytical description
of the activities covered. Article 8 stipulates that:
The scope of the register covers all activities [...] carried out with
the objective of directly or indirectly influencing the formulation
or implementation of policy and the decision-making processes
of the EU institutions, irrespective of the channel or medium of
communication used, for example outsourcing, media, contracts
with professional intermediaries, think-tanks, platforms, forums,
campaigns and grassroots initiatives. These activities include, in-
ter alia, contacting Members, officials or other staff of the EU insti-
tutions, preparing, circulating and communicating letters, informa-
tion material or discussion papers and position papers, and organ-
ising events, meetings or promotional activities and social events or
11
Ibid, s 3. The period was six months before the overhaul by the Honest Leadership and Open
Government Act of 2007, s 201(b).
12
See W Luneburg, `The Evolution of Federal Lobbying Regulation: where we are now and where
we should be going' (2009) 41McGeorge LR 85, 91-92, 119.
13
European Commission, Green Paper: European Transparency Initiative, 3 May 2006, 5
<http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/eti/docs/gp_en.pdf> [accessed 25 July 2013].
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conferences, invitations to which have been sent to Members, offi-
cials or other staff of the EU institutions. Voluntary contributions
and participation in formal consultations on envisaged EU legisla-
tive or other legal acts and other open consultations are also in-
cluded.14
The Agreement does not use the word lobbying', but within the context of this
article its description will be the benchmark for the definition of this activity
under EU law.
3 Distinguishing features of the law of lobbying in
the US and in the EU
We can now move to outline the essential aspects of the law and case law
concerning lobbying in the US and in the EU. It is clearly outside the scope of this
work to go into the details of lobbying regulation: as explained in Part 1, I will just
briefly describe the features that are most important for the sake of contrasting
the constitutional aspects of the problem.
3.1 The law of lobbying in the US
For many decades, there was only piecemeal regulation of lobbying in the US.15
Nonetheless, the SupremeCourt had a chance to express its view of this activity in
a line of cases between the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th,
concerning the enforcement of lobbying contracts with a contingent fee clause
(i.e. where the fee to be paid was contingent on whether the lobbying effort had
been successful or not). In these rulings,16 the Supreme Court held such contracts
unenforceable, because they posed too big a threat of corruption and of sacrificing
the common interest for the sake of private benefits. In fact, in its reasoning, the
Court was severely critical of the practice of lobbying itself, stating, for example,
in the most important of these cases, that:
14
Transparency Register Agreement, 22 July 2011, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/Lex
UriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2011:191:0029:0038:EN:PDF> [accessed 25 July 2013] Part IV, Art 8. Art.
10 of the Transparency Register Agreement then lists a series of `Activities excluded'.
15
See W N Eskridge Jr, `Federal Lobbying Regulation: History Through 1954', in W V Luneburg, T
M Susman & R H Gordon (eds), The Lobbying Manual: A Complete Guide to Federal Lobbying Law
and Practice (4th edn, 2009), 5-21.
16
Marshall v Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Co, 57 US 314 (1853); Providence Tool Co v Norris, 69 US 45
(1864); Trist v Child, 88 US 441 (1874); Hazelton v Sheckels, 202 US 71 (1906).
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If any of the great corporations of the country were to hire adven-
turers who make market of themselves in this way, to procure the
passage of a general law with a view to the promotion of their pri-
vate interests, the moral sense of every right-minded man would in-
stinctively denounce the employer and employed as steeped in cor-
ruption and the employment as infamous.17
However, in the following decades, things changed. First, the Supreme Court
distinguished its precedents on contingent fee lobbying in a 1927 case,18 where
it held that a contract was not automatically contrary to public policy for
merely contemplating an `undertaking to procure the passage of [...] ordinances':
in this particular case, the contract under consideration did not `requir[e] or
contemplat[e] the obtaining of legislative or executive action as a matter of favor
by means of personal influence, solicitation, and the like, or by other improper
or corrupt means', and was therefore to be considered valid and enforceable.
Then, two decades later, in 1946, the first comprehensive law on lobbying was
enacted, the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act (FRLA).19 The FRLA imposed
on lobbyists some duties of registration and disclosure. By choosing to regulate
lobbying (even though targeting only legislative lobbying, leaving unregulated
the lobbying of the executive), Congress implicitly recognised the legitimacy of
the activity: as long as lobbying was carried on in compliance with the FRLA, it
was not illegal. This reflected a very different attitude towards lobbying, that a
few years later surfaced in the Supreme Court, too. The Court first raised some
`doubts of constitutionality' with regard to restrictions of lobbying activities in
a 1953 case United States v Rumely, which did not relate to the FRLA but was
in anyway crucial.20 That case involved the interpretation of the powers of the
House Committee on Lobbying Activities, that was entrusted with the task of
investigating `all lobbying activities intended to influence, encourage, promote, or
retard legislation'.21 The Court held that the phrase `lobbying activities' had to be
interpreted narrowly, because otherwise the powers of inquiry of the Committee
would have been too broad, and would have encroached upon the `prohibition
of the First Amendment'.22 It was therefore not lobbying itself that had to be
17
Trist v Child, 88 US 441 (1874), 451.
18
Steele v Drummond, 275 US 199 (1927).
19
Legislative Reorganization Act 1946 (US) Title III.
20
United States v Rumely, 345 US 41(1953), 46.
21
House Resolution 298, 81st Cong., 1st Session, 12 August 1949.
22
United States v Rumely, above n 20, 46.
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limited, but rather restrictions on it, in order not to infringe a constitutional
right. In particular, Rumely made it clear for the first time that any regulation
of lobbying had to be carefully drafted in order to avoid limiting the freedoms
strongly protected by the First Amendment.
This reasoning was the underpinning for a challenge to the FRLA the
next year: petitioners argued that the registration and disclosure requirements
violated their `freedoms guaranteed by the First Amendment—freedom to speak,
publish, and petition the Government'.23 In what is still the leading case on
lobbying decided by the US Supreme Court, United States v Harriss, Chief
Justice Warren, writing for the majority, gave a narrow interpretation of the
sections establishing the field of application of the new duties. However, he
concluded that, thus interpreted, such duties were permissible; indeed, for the
`full realization of the American ideal of government by elected representatives',
Congress should be able to know to which pressures it is being subjected.24
Harriss fell short of finding a `constitutional right to lobby', something that,
according tomany commentators, was never really acknowledged by the Court.25
However, following the reasoning already suggested by the dissenters inHarriss,26
the Court in its later Noerr27 decision affirmed that `the whole concept of
representation depends upon the ability of the people tomake theirwishes known
to their representatives',28 and accordingly that lobbying was a legitimate activity
23
United States v Harriss, 347 US 612 (1954), 625.
24
Ibid, 625.
25
See e.g. S A Browne, `The Constitutionality of Lobby Reform: Implicating Associational Privacy
and the Right to Petition the Government' (1995) 4 William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal 717,
729-732; A P Thomas, `Easing the Pressure on Pressure Groups: Toward a Constitutional Right
to Lobby' (1993) Harv J of L & Public Policy 149, 150. Instead, A B Morrison, `Introduction:
Lobbyists—Saints or Sinners?' (2008) 19 Stan L & Policy Rev 1, 1 simply writes that `as all the
authors recognize, the right to lobby is the right to petition the government for redress of
grievances, which is explicitly protected by the First Amendment'.
26
Justices Douglas, Black & Jackson. See especially United States v Harriss, above n 23, 635 ( Jackson
J): `the First Amendment forbids Congress to abridge the right of the people ``to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances''. If this right is to have an interpretation consistent
with that given to other First Amendment rights, it confers a large immunity upon activities
of persons, organizations, groups and classes to obtain what they think is due them from
government. Of course, their conflicting claims and propaganda are confusing, annoying, and, at
times, no doubt, deceiving and corrupting. But we may not forget that our constitutional system
is to allow the greatest freedom of access to Congress, so that the people may press for their
selfish interests, with Congress acting as arbiter of their demands and conflicts'.
27
Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v Noerr Motor Freight Inc, 365 US 127 (1961) (opinion by
Justice Black, who dissented in United States v Harriss, above n 23).
28
Ibid, 137.
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even when it had anti-competitive effects. In a more recent case, Regan v Taxation
With Representation,29 Justice Blackmun (joined by Brennan andMarshall JJ), in his
concurrence even wrote that `lobbying is protected by the First Amendment'.30
Therefore, the idea developed that limitations on lobbying could not go beyond a
certain threshold: registration and disclosure were deemed not to infringe First
Amendment rights, but the First Amendment has become the `elephant in the
room' in any effort to regulate lobbying. The Court never explicitly invoked it to
strike down any lobbying law, but legislators knew that this chance was always
there, if they went too far in restricting this activity. This case law was, indeed,
known to the Congress when, in 1995, it finally reached a consensus on replacing
the FRLA with a new law of lobbying (that also covers lobbying of the executive
branch), after such change had been advocated from different sides for many
years. This new law is the already mentioned LDA.31
The underlying thread of the LDA, as is clear from the title, is the duty of
disclosure: except for registration in the register of lobbyists, the LDA does
not impose any particular limit to this activity or to how to carry it on. The
only condition for the LDA is that certain relevant information is recorded and
made public through periodic reports. Harriss, although relative to the FRLA,
is still controlling for the legitimacy of these disclosure obligations imposed
on lobbyists, given the identity of rationale of the FRLA and the LDA in this
respect: the LDA also makes it clear that nothing in it `shall be construed to
prohibit or interferewith—(1) the right to petition theGovernment for the redress
of grievances; (2) the right to express a personal opinion; or (3) the right of
association, protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution'.32 The LDA
is still the most relevant regulation of lobbying in the US (even if it has been
amended several times, the most important of which is by the Honest Leadership
and Open Government Act of 2007). In past years, however, there have been
significant developments thatmay eventually lead to a new pronouncement of the
SupremeCourt. In particular, the landmark campaign finance caseCitizens United
v Federal Election Commission (Citizens United),33 where the Supreme Court held
that the prohibition on corporations (and unions) to contribute from their general
treasury funds to political campaigns, violated those entities' First Amendment
29
Regan v Taxation With Representation, 461 US 540, 552 (1983).
30
Ibid, 552.
31
LDA, above n 9, Part II. For a comment, see e.g. Luneburg, Susman & Gordon, above n 15,
Chapters 3-6.
32
LDA, above n 9, s 8(a).
33
558 US 50 (2010).
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political rights, is starting to have effects in the closely connected field of
lobbying.34
Relying onCitizens United's strong stand in favour of the freedom of everyone
to influence the political process to the best of his ability, the US Court of Appeal
for the SecondCircuit inGreen Party of Connecticut v Garfield, and a federal district
court in Ohio in Brinkman v Budish struck down, respectively, `a Connecticut law
that barred campaign contributions to state candidates by lobbyists' and `a law
barring lobbyists from engaging in fundraising', on the one hand, and `a ``revolving
door'' statute that barred former state legislators and staffers from lobbying the
legislature for 12 months after leaving service',35 on the other. This litigation
never ended up in the Supreme Court, which would have presumably confirmed
the legitimacy of disclosure rules;36 however, in the future, the Court might
strike down laws that impose further obligations,37 on the grounds that they risk
`chilling' some political speech that would otherwise contribute to public debate:
an explicit acknowledgment of a First Amendment right to lobbying, thus, may
be on its way.
3.2 The law of lobbying in the EU
Moving to EU law, the first thing to notice is that rules are provided only relative
to the Commission and the Parliament: there is no regulation for lobbying
the other institutions, including the European Council and the Council of the
European Union. For a long time, the existing rules were separate for the
Commission and the Parliament. They have been unified only recently.
The first official document dealing with the issue dates back only to 1992,
when the Commission issued the policy paper `An open and structured dialogue
between the Commission and interest groups'.38 This paper would not lead
34
On the links between lobbying and campaign finance, see R Briffault, `Lobbying and Campaign
Finance: Separate and Together' (2008) 19 Stan L & Policy Rev 105; after Citizens United, ibid, see
H Gerken, `Lobbying as the New Campaign Finance' (2011) 27 Georgia State ULR 1155. See also J
E Sandler, `Lobbyists and Election Law: The New Challenge', in Luneburg, Susman & Gordon,
above n 15, 751, and the relative `Update' in the Fourth Edition 2011 Supplement.
35
Hasen, above n 3, 4.
36
Deemed legitimate by Citizens United itself, which even relied on United States v Harriss, above n
23, in its reasoning: Citizens United, above n 33, 103.
37
Hasen, above n 3, 24.
38
European Commission, An open and structured dialogue between the Commission and interest
groups (1992) <http://ec.europa.eu/civil_society/interest_groups/docs/v_en.pdf> [accessed 25
July 2013].
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to any significant lobbying regulation for many years. A major change finally
occurred in 2005, when the Commission launched the European Transparency
Initiative (ETI) with an internal paper.39 This was followed by the 2006 Green
Paper, which among other things focused on `the need for a more structured
framework for the activities of interest representatives (lobbyists)'.40 The Green
Paper listed what in the Commission's view were the essential principles `on
which the relationship between the EU institutions and lobbyists should be built'.
They are very significant for the purposes of this work, so it is worth quoting
them all:
1. Lobbying is a legitimate part of the democratic system [...] 2. Lob-
byists can help bring important issues to the attention of the Euro-
pean institutions. [...] 3. At the same time, undue influence should
not be exerted on the European institutions through improper lob-
bying. 4. When lobby groups seek to contribute to EU policy de-
velopment, it must be clear to the general public which input they
provide to the European institutions. It must also be clear who they
represent, what their mission is and how they are funded. 5. In-
herent in the European institutions' obligation to identify and safe-
guard the `general interest of the Community' is their right to hold
internal deliberations without interference from outside interests.
6. Measures in the field of transparency must be effective and pro-
portionate.41
Two aspects of this passage are particularly relevant to the present analysis. The
first one is the remarkable openness towards lobbying that the Commission
shows in it: certainly, transparency is important, and disclosure requirements and
rules of integrity (as the following paragraphs of the paper explain) are essential
to achieve this goal; but in the words of the Commission there is no particular
concern for the danger that lobbying could corrupt the integrity of the democratic
process, a risk that even the dissenters inHarriss had acknowledged.42 The second
point is that there is no mention of free speech: lobbying seems to be constructed
39
European Commission, European Transparency Initiative, 9 November 2005 <http://ec.eur
opa.eu/transparency/eti/index_en.htm > [accessed 25 July 2013].
40
European Commission, above n 13.
41
Ibid, 5, citing Art 213 of the EC Treaty (now Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Art
245, though the new treaty does no longer contain the relevant language).
42
See especially in particular the words from Justice Jackson quoted supra (n 26).
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in a very different way than the American individualistic right to petition the
government for a redress of one's own grievances. I will develop this observation
in the conclusions (Part 4.2). There is a further aspect of the Green Paper that
needs to be underlined. This is the point made by the Commission that it:
does not consider that a compulsory registration system would be
an appropriate option. A tighter system of self-regulation would
appear more appropriate. However, after a certain period, a re-
view should be conducted to examine whether self-regulation has
worked. If not, consideration could be given to a system of com-
pulsory measures—a compulsory code of conduct plus compulsory
registration.
Therefore, at least in principle, the Commission showed a clear preference for
regulating lobbying by non-compulsory registration: it would be incorrect thus
to consider this choice as a first-step, or an incomplete form of regulation,
compared to the American model. Instead, the Commission made clear that, if
such model produced satisfactory results, it would be content with it, and would
not see the need for compulsory registration.
The Green Paper was followed the next year by a new policy paper,43
which launched a road map for the adoption of a common code of conduct
and a new register for lobbyists.44 This document stressed `once again that
the Commission's definition of ``lobbying'' did not include any negative value
judgment' and emphasised `the legitimate and useful role of lobbying activities in a
democratic system'45 (even though, to avoid misunderstandings, the Commission
chose to call the register, `Register for Interest Representatives'). Then, in 2008, a
new policy paper, still within the ETI framework, was adopted, containing a code
of conduct and providing that breaches of it by the representative of a registered
entity could lead to the suspension or exclusion of that entity from the Register.46
43
European Commission, Follow-up to the Green Paper `European Transparency Initiative', 21 March
2007 <http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/eti/docs/com_2007_127_final_en.pdf> [accessed 25
July 2013].
44
Until then, only the CONECCS (Consultation, the European Commission and Civil Society)
database existed, gathering the contributions received from interest groups during a consultation
on a Commission's initiative; the paper provided for the discontinuing of such database.
45
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Furthermore, `contributions to public consultations [by registered entities] will
be published on the internet together with the identity of the contributor'.47 The
Register of Interest Representatives was opened on June 23, 2008.48
The European Parliament (EP) has also introduced its own regulation.
Indeed, lobbying of this institution increased in intensity together with the
increase of its powers: the more it became an essential player in the legislative
process, the more it became the object of attention and pressure by lobbyists.49
As a result, the EP felt the need to discipline the relationships between them and
its members. It did so in 1996, by introducing in its Rules of Procedure (then
Rule 9(4)) a system of `nominative passes valid for a maximum of one year [to be
issued] to persons who wish to enter Parliament's premises frequently in order
to supply information to members within the framework of their parliamentary
mandate in their own interests or those of third parties'.50 In return, those
who requested a pass were required to respect a code of conduct and sign a
register that was made available to the public.51 This framework was recently
overhauled by the Transparency Register Agreement,52 which has finally brought
about a joint register of lobbyists for the Commission and the Parliament.53
However, what we need to point out is that registration is still non-compulsory,
and remains necessary only if lobbyists want to obtain long-term access to the
EP premises—registration is not required for carrying out the job itself. After all,
the Agreement is a non-legislative measure, and some legislative-type provision
would be required to introduce a mandatory form of registration. The only other
practical advantage in return for registering is the fact that the Commission will
alert registered entities every time it publishes a new road map or launches a
public consultation in the field that entity is interested in. If a lobbyist declines
47
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to register, this does not currently have significant practical effects on his or her
professional activities.
In the first Annual Report on the operations of the Transparency Register,
it was revealed that `[a]s of 22 October 2012 there were 5431 registrants in the
TR12 in total, of which almost half (48%) have registered as Category II (In-house
lobbyists and trade/professional associations) and about 28% in Category III
(NGOs)'.54 We cannot conclude without mentioning a few statements made
by the European Parliament in its decision to issue the inter-institutional
agreement.55 First of all its reference to Article 11(2) TEU, according to which
`[t]he institutions shall maintain an open, transparent and regular dialogue with
representative associations and civil society'. The principles of Article 11 were
introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon and now sanction the necessity that the
European institutions maintain an open dialogue with interest groups.56 But the
EP also takes some positions that mark a distance with some of the views that
the Commission expressed in the past: it explicitly describes the agreement as
a `first step towards greater transparency'; more to the point, it repeats `its call
for the mandatory registration of all lobbyists on the Transparency Register and
calls for the necessary steps to be taken in the framework of the forthcoming
review process in order to prepare for a transition to mandatory registration'.
The Parliament is, therefore, clearly pushing towards the adoption of a US-style
mandatory registration system, contrary to what has been—at least so far—the
preferred option of the Commission.57 Finally, the Parliament also makes a
significant call to the Council to adhere to the agreement: it `regrets that the
Council has not yet become a party to the agreement, although that is crucial in
order to ensure transparency at all stages in the law-making process at Union
level; welcomes, however, the fact that the Council has indicated that it will
54
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become a party to the agreement; calls on the Council to join the common register
as soon as possible'. Indeed, the absence of any sort of regulation for the lobbying
of the Council is a remarkable gap, in a way comparable to the one that existed in
the FRLA in the US, and it would be reasonable to expect that, exactly like in that
country, it is eventually remedied, in this case by a voluntary act by the Council.
Admittedly, the lack of regulation as far as the Council, as well as the
European Council, is concerned might be partially compensated by national
regulations: by controlling how lobbyists influence the representatives of the
respective member states to the Council, national lobbying rules indirectly
provide a control over the decisions of this inter-state organ. However, this might
not provide a sufficient amount of transparency for the EU nationals: partly
because such rules are country-specific and therefore nationals of other member
states might have difficulty in accessing the information relative to a country
other than their own; partly because several member states essentially do not
mandate transparency for lobbying activities brought about on their territory;
and partly because even where transparency is sufficiently guaranteed at the
national level, lobbying the national representatives to the Council is something
rather different than lobbying the state government, and might easily not be
covered by domestic regulations. Therefore, a comprehensive regulation of
lobbying in the EUwouldmandate at least full disclosure of all `lobbying contacts'
(to use the phrase adopted by American law) between interest representatives
and Council and European Council members and staff,58 and possibly some
`revolving door' ban.
58
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4 Protecting freedom or democracy?
4.1 A free speech exception?
The traditional account of the protection of free speech in the US and in Europe
describes the former as the land ofMadison's,59 Tocqueville's60 andMill's61 spirit,
while the latter as more concerned with balancing individualistic freedom of
expression and associational rights with the need to protect democracy.
Madison subscribed to the view that letting all voices be heard, thus making
`ambition [...] to counteract ambition',62 is preferable to silencing all voices, lest
the most powerful of them should drown the weak ones and have too much
influence. His assumption was that there was more to be gained from leaving
special interests free to speak against each other, even if this came at the cost
of allowing some room for excesses and corruption, than from insulating public
officials from all influence, thus making them decide without listening to the
views of the concerned and competing parties. As Madison wrote:
Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and
interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole
will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens;
or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all
who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with
each other. Besides other impediments, it may be remarked, that
where there is a consciousness of unjust or dishonorable purposes,
communication is always checked by distrust, in proportion to the
number whose concurrence is necessary.63
Tocqueville famously described the considerably beneficial effect for the Ameri-
can society arising from the existence in the US of such a great number of active
associations and groups, pursuing the most disparate interests. As Tocqueville
observed:
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When once the right of association is recognized, the citizens may
employ it in several different ways. An association consists simply
in the public assent which a number of individuals give to certain
doctrines, and in the engagement which they contract to promote
the spread of those doctrines by their exertions. ... When an opinion
is represented by a society, it necessarily assumes a more exact
and explicit form. It numbers its partisans, and compromises their
welfare in its cause: they, on the other hand, become acquainted
with each other, and their zeal is increased by their number. An
association unites the efforts of minds which have a tendency to
diverge in one single channel, and urges them vigorously towards
one single end which it points out.
The second degree in the right of association is the power of
meeting. When an association is allowed to establish centres of
action at certain important points in the country, its activity is
increased and its influence extended. [...]
Lastly, in the exercise of the right of political association, there is
a third degree: the partisans of an opinion may unite in electoral
bodies, and choose delegates to represent them in a central assembly.
This is, properly speaking, the application of the representative
system to a party.
Thus, in the first instance, a society is formed between individuals
professing the same opinion, and the tie which keeps it together is of
a purely intellectual nature; in the second case, small assemblies are
formed which only represent a fraction of the party. Lastly, in the
third case, they constitute a separate nation in the midst of the na-
tion, a government within the Government. Their delegates, like the
real delegates of the majority, represent the entire collective force of
their party; and they enjoy a certain degree of that national dignity
and great influence which belong to the chosen representatives of
the people.64
Along similar lines, chapter two of Mill's masterpiece, `On Liberty', `is most
famous for being the definitive exposition of the (social) epistemic arguments for
freedom of expression—the ways in which freedom of expression functions as an
64
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indispensable aid in the societal identification of truth (and exposure of falsity),
and, thus, in the fostering of public knowledge'.65 In Mill's own words:
Not the violent conflict between parts of the truth, but the quiet
suppression of half of it, is the formidable evil: there is always hope
when people are forced to listen to both sides; it is when they attend
only to one that errors harden into prejudices, and truth itself ceases
to have the effect of truth, by being exaggerated into falsehood. And
since there are few mental attributes more rare than that judicial
faculty which can sit in intelligent judgment between two sides of
a question, of which only one is represented by an advocate before
it, truth has no chance but in proportion as every side of it, every
opinion which embodies any fraction of the truth, not only finds
advocates, but is so advocated as to be listened to.66
The right to freely express one's ideas is thus seen as beneficial for the whole
society, because the competition and even clash of different ideas is the most
effective way to let the better ideas emerge and prevail over the worse. This line
of thought famously influenced all the First Amendment jurisprudence in the US,
but such influence was made possible by a constitutional background very fertile
to its taking root. The American Bill of Rights allowed such a jurisprudence
to develop because it had been conceived in a relatively virgin institutional
environment: in the newly-establishedUnited States, the federal governmentwas
still very limited, and this allowed the establishment of clear, absolute principles
with a strong idealistic value.
Europe, on the other hand, is usually portrayed as less `Madisonian': free
speech is obviously strongly protected by all the existing catalogues of rights in
Europe too, but it does not play the `sacred' role that it plays in the US, where
the almost absolute protection afforded to the freedom of speech shapes the
way American democracy itself is constructed. We need to be careful not to
oversimplify in tracing back the historical reasons for this difference to one single
event or to the influence of one single author. If we had to pick up one reference,
however, it would be inevitable to mention Rousseau and his well-known idea
of the dangers for the common good of the society inherent in the pursuit by
65
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everyone of their own selfish interests.67 As Rousseau writes in a paragraph on
democracy in `The Social Contract':
Nothing is more dangerous than the influence of private interests
in public affairs, and the abuse of the laws by the government is a
less evil than the corruption of the legislator, which is the inevitable
sequel to a particular standpoint. In such a case, the State being
altered in substance, all reformation becomes impossible.68
Undoubtedly, the tragic experience of totalitarianism also influenced the Euro-
pean approach to the protection of free speech, particularly when such speech
threatens the survival of democracy. So Europe in general never protected the
freedom of expression of terrorists, political extremists, racists, holocaust de-
niers, and the like, at least not to the same extent as America did.69 Instead,
European courts developed proportionality analysis and used it to balance the
freedom of expression with the need to safeguard democracy;70 similarly, leg-
islators passed laws aimed at punishing those manifestation of thought that run
counter to the basic tenets of liberal democracy, thus endangering its very sur-
vival.71 Along the same lines, German constituents famously incorporated the
principle of `militant democracy' in the Basic Law, archetypal of a certain way of
conceiving democracy, and of the need to establish legal (chiefly constitutional)
safeguards to protect it.72 Article 10 of the European Convention on Human
67
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Rights is phrased in terms of need to balance the freedom of expression with the
need to protect democracy:
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right
shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart
information and ideas without interference by public authority and
regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from
requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties
and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions,
restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary
in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial
integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for
the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation
or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received
in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the
judiciary.73
While the constitutional moment in the US happened when the government was
light and its perimeter narrow, the post-World War II wave of constitutionalism
in Europe took place when the state had decidedly expanded, and the institutional
background was much more developed. Therefore, the protection of freedom of
expression was (re)born in a context heavily influenced by positive law and thus
with inevitable limitations. These few hints were just to suggest that it would
have been reasonable to expect that, consistently with this framework, Europe
would have paid more attention to the need to safeguard democracy also in the
field of lobbying, and consequently would have enacted legislation that at least
balanced this exigency with the one of allowing the freedom to communicate
and to exert pressure on public officials. Yet the picture we have drawn is quite
different. This can be quite surprising at first sight. Indeed one could expect a
syllogism like this: a) no fundamental right, in Europe or elsewhere, is protected
with the same intensity as free speech rights are protected in the US; (b) (even
though with the caveats of Part 3.2) lobbying in the US falls within the free speech
realm; (c) therefore, lobbying should not be as protected anywhere as it is in the
US. However, after reviewing the EU law of lobbying, we learned that lobbying
American Political Science Rev 417; and K Loewenstein, `Militant Democracy and Fundamental
Rights II' (1937) 31 The American Political Science Rev 638.
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in the EU, even after the recent overhaul, is an almost unregulated activity: the
reforms of May 2011, however significant, still do not set up a mandatory system
of registrations for those who engage in this activity.
We saw that it would be inappropriate to explain the choice of the EU, so far,
not to regulate lobbying through compulsory requirements, with the fact that the
EU has only recently experienced the growth of a lobbying industry to an extent
comparable to the US level. Indeed, even if such an account has been suggested
by the Parliament itself in its May 2011 decision, which reaffirmed its view of the
need to introduce a system of mandatory registration,74 the Commission took
the opposite view—so far that view has prevailed. Apparently, then, we may be
faced with an unexpected `free speech exception', namely of having found an area
of free speech that departs from the usual lines, the lines of a US that protects
free speech to the maximum extent, and of a Europe more willing to balance its
protection with the perceived needs of democracy. Apparently, the regulation of
lobbying would follow a different track. But is that really the case?
4.2 Freedom or democracy: two different reasons for
protecting lobbying
To be sure, even admitting, arguendo, that Part 4.1's stylized description of free
speech protection in the US and the EU is accurate, such a hypothesised `free
speech exception' is based on a faulty assumption, i.e. that the reasons for
protecting lobbying are the same in both the legal systems. I demonstrated
that things are quite different: in no EU document is there a reference to
the freedom of expression as the constitutional basis for protecting lobbying.
Instead, the Commission clearly indicated another constitutional ground: the
promotion of a well-functioning (participatory) democracy, giving voice to all the
stakeholders who want to be involved in the decision-making process. Certainly,
American and European law share very similar definitions of `lobbying' (as was
analysed in Part 2), and the activity itself to which these definitions refer to is
substantially the same: in both cases, lobbying is looked at as the enterprise of
`stably intermediating' between the polity and the legislators/regulators.
However, the way constitutional law looks at lobbying is significantly
different on the two sides of the Atlantic. TheUS considers it a form of expression
(whether it is characterised as speech, association, or petition),75 by which natural
74
European Parliament, above n 55.
75
See N W Allard, `Lobbying is an Honorable Profession: The Right to Petition and the
474 Riccardo de Caria
and legal76 persons pursue their own individualistic goals and interests before
public decision-makers. On the one hand, this aids development of a healthy
democracy, given the assumption that a sort of `invisible hand' will lead the
pursuit of selfish goals to maximise general utility in the political realm,77 and
considering that the fact that this is done through professionally trained stable
intermediaries who help individual interests to be transmitted effectively to
democratic venues. Still, lobbying remains first of all a fundamental freedom of
the individual (or the corporation), acting in pursuit of his (or its) selfish benefit.
In the EU, it is the other way around. The European Commission's
Green Paper and other European documents described above consider lobbying
functional to democracy, and the reason to protect it is the beneficial contribution
of knowledge and expertise it can bring to decision-making by European
institutions. Lobbying may certainly be seen as a form of political expression, but
in the EU it remains first of all an activity that serves the goals of participatory
democracy, now epitomised in Article 11 TEU: here, the stable intermediation
exercised by lobbyists is strategic to the institutional model of communicating
opinions and needs from the special interests to the policy-makers. If that is
true, the apparent puzzle is solved. Indeed, in Europe the democratic principle
arguably underpins the whole legal system, comparable to the centrality of free
speech in American constitutional discourse. We can then identify a different
syllogism: a) Europe is built around the inspiring principle of democracy; b)
lobbying in the EU is interpreted as a way to fulfill the principle of (participatory)
democracy, and c) therefore, lobbying in the EU understandably enjoys a very
strong level of protection. Admittedly, the Parliament has pleaded for the
introduction of some restrictions on this activity, in the form of mandatory
registration, disclosure, and rules of conduct. This does not, however, change the
fact that, in the EU, both the reasons for protection and the reasons for restriction
fall in the realm of the democratic principle. So far, the reasons for protection
have outweighed those for restriction. However, there seems to be a growing
sense that a different balance needs to be struck, as advocated by the EP. Similarly,
Competition to Be Right' (2008) 19 Stan L & Policy Rev 23, 36-42; E Garrett, R M Levin & T
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in the US a movement has arisen calling for tightening of he existing rules. When
it comes to this, the respective constitutional grounds for protecting lobbying are
crucial in determining how far regulation can go.
There is another aspect. The very structure of the respective legal systems
plays an important role in shaping the constitutional arguments for the protec-
tion of lobbying in the US and in Europe. The intrinsic flexibility of the Amer-
ican common law system creates large opportunities for lobbying as a way to
participate in shaping the execution of the law.78 As was captured by Jefferson
in a famous dictum of his, `[t]he execution of the laws is more important than the
making of them':79 and in a common law system like the US, lobbying has partic-
ular room to shape such execution. Both the law-making and the law-execution
are therefore more open to contributions by external actors. Specifically on the
former, it can be added that the legislative process characteristic of the American
systemmight seem to entrust the rule-making job to the contest among contrast-
ing interests: apparently, `stable intermediaries' able to influence the relationship
between such interests and the law-makers do not fit into this scheme. However,
these intermediaries have grown to become the agents of special interest, their
actual substitutes, so their presence does not really alter the common law model
of law-making: they no longer are truly outside actors, rather they identify them-
selves with the interests they represent to the point that they become genuinely
part of the game.
On the other hand, continental European legal systems turn out to be
more rigid, influenced by the view that the primary law-making body is the
parliamentary assembly: lobbying certainly exists at the executive level too, but
it is traditionally more constrained, and it tends to be focused principally on the
law-maker. Moreover, the law-making there tends to be more impermeable to
external contributions, in the end leaving less room for outside actors to come
to play on the parliamentary field. One might think that civil-law systems are
more inclined to accommodate the role of stable intermediaries as advisers of
the law-makers, given that their constituencies traditionally have less access to
legislators than in Anglo-Saxon countries, and therefore some regular connection
with the constituency needs to be established. Nonetheless, at a closer look, the
civil law law-making system ends up insulating in a way legislators from the
polity, thus making the task of bridging the gap between them harder to perform.
This might account, at least in part, for the great protection of lobbying that
78
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we have observed at the European level. For the institutional reasons hinted at
here, in civil law systems lobbying has less room to develop. This might explain
why lobbying arose at a later time in Europe and why Europe tends to afford
protection to lobbying to such a great extent: it will never go beyond certain
borders anyway.
This brings us to a further point: so-called grassroots lobbying, typically
brought about for idealistic and non-economic reasons, is far more developed
in the US than in Europe.80 One plausible explanation from the institutional
and constitutional point of view is that the American legal system leaves more
room for lobbying practiced at different levels: the fact that lobbying can be
conducted in multiple fora provides more opportunities for practicing it. In this
`market' the opportunity for idealistic, grassroots lobbying arises, while in the
more constrained European environment the market for lobbying tends to be
monopolised by economically motivated players.
If we look in particular at lobbying at the legislative level, a further difference
relates to the power of Congressional committees in the US. These committees
play a key role in the legislative process81 and this gives their individual members
great power, which creates a strong incentive for lobbyists to win their favour.
The situation is different in the European Parliament; due to the use of the
so-called trilogues (informal meetings held during the legislative process in
the EU, attended by representatives from the Council, the Parliament and the
Commission), committees and individual legislators have less power than their
American counterparts.82 This reduces the concern that lobbyists might distort
the law-making process, possibly explaining the lighter-touch approach that we
have seen.
Finally, and connected to this, one last aspect to consider is the level of
party discipline in the two legal systems reviewed. The European Parliament
has maintained the high level of party discipline typical of the individual EU
80
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member states. An interesting study published in 2008, whose first results were
presented more than ten years ago (at the 2001 Annual Meeting of the American
Political Science),83 showed that party discipline in the European Parliament was
remarkable even at the beginning of the life of this organ, and has substantially
increased in parallel with the growth of the powers entrusted to such assembly.84
Even in the absence of a party whip system as rigid as the one in place in European
parliamentary democracies, this was realised through the appointment of the
most loyal MEPs in the most prestigious committees (admittedly, committee
membership affords less power to legislators in the EU than in the US, as was
just said, but appointment in the most important committees is anyway a valued
reward). The situation in the US is very different: political parties have much
less control over the selection of the candidates and over the behaviour of
Congressmen. A candidacy tends to be more of an individual enterprise, not
controlled by political parties, and this reflects on how candidates behave once
elected, namely party discipline is much less stringent here. As a result, there
would seem to be a higher incentive for pressure groups to lobby individual
members of Congress, while in the European Parliament it is essentially the group
leaders' favour that has to be won. This creates more opportunities for lobbying
in the US, and would seem to account for the relatively minor concern showed by
European institutions in allowing virtually unrestricted lobbying of single MEPs.
5 Conclusion
The comparison drawn leads me to submit first of all that the different constitu-
tional underpinnings of lobbying protection would let the EU go further than the
US in regulating it. Indeed, the role played by the First Amendment rights in the
US cannot tolerate burdens to a greater extent than the one declared legitimate in
Harriss. In fact, the traditional rationale relied on in that case may not even hold
any more: the LDA already based the justification of its restrictions on the need
to inform the public, rather than Congress (as in Harriss's reasoning);85 more im-
portantly, the two cases of the Citizens United progeny mentioned at the end of
3.1. `should be viewed like a canary in the coal mine, signalling that lobbying laws
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that were once seen as easily passing constitutional muster now face a potentially
difficult path'.86 Legislators will then have to be very careful in limiting lobby-
ing by selecting the less restrictive alternative, otherwise the Supreme Court may
eventually strike them down for breach of the First Amendment guarantees. In
Europe, on the other hand, the sole consideration is the democratic principle, and
therefore regulation could potentially even forbid certain lobbying activities, if it
were deemed that this would better serve the democratic principle: no `constitu-
tional' obstacle would prevent this.
One should, indeed, never overlook the historical roots lying behind the
regulatory choices of the two areas under consideration: as I have tried to show,
legal history explains a lot of the current regulatory framework in the lobbying
field, and warns Europe against simply importing rules from overseas. The
inner characters of common law and civil law influence how and to what extent
lobbying can develop and should always be taken into accountwhen legislating on
the subject. This fundamental caveat, however, does not mean that the American
law of lobbying could not be taken as a useful model by European institutions,
and therefore that comparing the two constitutional and regulatory schemes is
sterile. In fact, if we look at other countries that have regulated lobbying,87 there
are certainly many important variables, but the core structure tends to be very
similar, with the recurring presence of registration and disclosure obligations,
plus some form of `revolving door' limitation; and this is due to the fact that the
essence of lobbying tends to be everywhere the function of `stable intermediation'
between special interests and policy-makers, that was shown as a constant factor
in the previous analysis. The American law has, indeed, been a model for several
other countries, so looking at the LDA for inspiration would be the most natural
of choices for Europe. In summary, as always when comparing the lobbying law
of the two systems and assessing the practicability of an imitation of American
regulation by the Europeans, it should never be overlooked that `much more than
legal rules needs to be subject to comparison':88 in adherence to this precept,
mine has been an attempt to shed a little light on the respective constitutional,
theoretical, and more broadly cultural backgrounds of lobbying regulation in the
two areas considered.
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